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abstraCt. Stróżyński Mateusz, Psychotic Phenomena in Euripides’ Heracles. 
The article is an attempt at the psychoanalytic interpretation of the Euripidean Heracles. The theory used 
to explain psychological phenomena of the play is Melanie klein’s concepts of the paranoid-schizoid and 
depressive position, as well as contributions to the understanding of psychotic thinking made by her followers: 
Hanna Segal, wilfred Bion, Herbert Rosenfeld, and John Steiner. Characters in the play, in their speech and 
behaviour, as well as in the chorus’ songs, reveal a significant number of primitive psychological mechanisms, 
such as splitting, denial, idealisation and projective identification. The analysis of those mechanisms expressed 
in literary material allows to see the much argued continuity of Euripides’ extraordinary play. 
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INTROdUCTION
The problem of the compositional structure of Euripides’ Heracles has 
drawn the attention of philologists from the outset. Lesky wrote that “it doesn’t 
resemble any other drama in Euripides’ canon”1 in terms of content, and kitto 
called it “the most enigmatic of Euripides’ pieces that have survived.”2 Some 
researchers have considered the tragedy as a broken composition; however, there 
is no consensus as to whether it breaks down into two or three separate parts, 
and where the dividing lines should be drawn.3 Other scholars have endeavoured 
to demonstrate the coherence of the work by referring to its topics or principle 
1 Lesky 2006, 425. 
2 kitto 1997, 220. 
3 Sheppard (1916, 7) sees three episodes in the tragedy – from the beginning to verse 814, 
since the appearance of Iris and Lyssa (815) until the awakening of Heracles (1087), and from 
there on to the end (p. 72). Lesky (2006, 435) was a proponent of the division into two parts, the 
second of which is a reversal of the first one. Harsh (1948, 199–200), likewise; he also argued that 
the existing criticism of inconsistency, in fact, clarified little. Murray (1946, 112) and Norwood 
(1964, 46–47), discern two parts, whereas kitto (1997, 221) – three parts. In subsequent studies 
there prevails a conviction that the composition consists of three parts: Chalk 1962, 7; kamerbeek 
1966, 2; Silk 1985, 2 
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ideas.4 Some works recognize the problem, and suggest that incoherence does not 
need to determine the tragedy’s structural weakness, but it could be the author’s 
intentional, artistic method.5 what’s interesting, however, seemingly none of the 
scholars has paid attention to the relation between problematic composition of 
Heracles and the most conspicuous topic of the tragedy: madness. Perhaps such 
an interpretation even seems to be too modern, as it would require recognising 
that the ancient author deliberately made his tragedy on madness incoherent and 
illogical, thus making the form a certain commentary on the content. 
One of the objectives of this article is to prove that both the incoherent 
structure of Heracles, and a series of illogicalities and discrepancies of other 
types present in the tragedy’s content make up an artistic expression of the 
principal subject of madness. This method, however, appears to be not so much 
conscious and intentional, as it results from the impact of the unconscious (in 
psychoanalytic terms) involved in the creative process. All philologists will 
surely agree that any author always has some conscious intentions concerning 
the shape of their work, whereas not necessarily many will agree that what may 
underlie it are some unconscious motifs which influence this shape with equal 
force, and to its aesthetic benefit. The latter requires recognising as true (or 
probable for that matter) the psychological conceptions of the human mind, and 
acknowledging the benefits of using the analytic method of thinking for the 
work of the classical philologist. 
In the first section of the article, I will demonstrate the methodological 
assumptions that allow such an application of psychoanalytic methods to 
interpret drama text. In the second section, I will briefly present a conception 
of the psychotic phenomena of one of the schools of psychoanalysis, which 
will provide a theoretical language to understand madness and its expressions 
in Heracles. In the subsequent section, I will make an analysis of psychotic 
phenomena in the tragedy until the appearance of Lyssa on the stage. Then, I will 
enter into discussion with other scholars’ views on the psychological coherence 
in Heracles, and I will suggest an explanation of the dynamics contributing to 
the climax – the main character’s madness. Subsequently, I will make a summary 
by comparing the discussed dynamics with the second part of the tragedy, and I 
will suggest a meaning for its radically different nature.
4 U. von wilamowitz-Moellendorf (1895, quoted after Chalk 1962, 7) – doric ideal of power 
punished Chalk 1962, 8 et seq. – place of human ἀρετή in the cosmos, kamerbeek 1966, 12 
et seq. – Heracles’ suppressed anger at Eurystheus bursts out, willink 1988. 86 et seq. – two 
meanings of πόνος, Silk 1985, 5 et seq. – Heracles’ dual divine-human nature, Hamilton 1985: 22 
and seq. – a whole array of topics in the debate between Amphitryon and Lycus, Fitzgerald 1991, 
92 – Heracles’ value system and his identity, Padilla 1992, 1 et seq. – symbolism of the bow and 
the glance.
5 Partly – Conacher 1967, 83, and particularly – Arrowsmith 1954, in the work cited by S. A. 
Barlow, S. A. Barlow herself (1982, 117 et seq.).
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1. “THE ANALYTIC THIRd” AS AN INTERSUBJECTIVE SPACE  
OF THE dRAMA (METHOdOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS)
The psychoanalytic method can be applied to interpret literary works in 
various manners, each of which may raise other types of doubts, and surely 
has its limitations. A tool that I’m going to use in this article is the notion of 
“the analytic third” (or “the third” in short) developed by Thomas Ogden for 
the purposes of analytic practice. However, this conception, clinical in nature, 
needs to be adjusted to the needs of literary studies. Ogden writes as follows: 
“In the analytic situation, as I perceive it, three subjects communicate with one 
another at an unconscious level: the patient and the analyst as separate subjects, 
and the intersubjective ‘analytic third’ (...). The unconscious intersubjective 
‘analytic third’ keeps revealing itself in the emotional field created in the 
exchange of the unconscious between the patient and the analyst. The third 
‘subject of the analysis’ is one that is created jointly, though asymmetrically, by 
the analytic pair. The task of the analyst as a separate subject is to recognise and 
verbally symbolise for themselves (over time) their experiences in the analytic 
third, and the experiences of the analytic third.”6 what seems to be useful in this 
conception for the classical philologist’s technique is the existence of essentially 
metaphorical, divided space which entirely belongs neither to the author of the 
tragedy, the spectator/reader, nor the work itself. This space resembles the subject 
in that it can be treated as a kind of mind whose fantasies, defence mechanisms, 
fears and emotions can be analysed using the psychoanalytic theory. 
In psychoanalysis or psychoanalytic psychotherapy, the therapist does not 
contact with the real person in their entire complexity, but with a certain aspect of 
the patient who interacts – in a very atypical and specifically determined situation 
– not with a real-person therapist, but with a certain aspect “the therapist.” All 
the patient does or tells assumes a symbolic meaning, thus expressing what 
happens in this relationship. when Ogden’s patient talks about the way she does 
the shopping or tries on clothes, this becomes symbolic – apart from the fact that 
her story’s characters are persons and not symbols, the way they behave towards 
one another expresses the patient’s unconscious world of fantasies. Finally, the 
patient tells in this very moment of her therapy about this specific event, and 
in a specific manner. This story was being listened to not by, say, the patient’s 
female friend, but her analyst, whose unconscious participated in this process. 
Ogden writes that once while his patient was talking about her dream, not about 
real shopping, he recalled helping his friend to buy an engagement ring back in 
his youth. This recollection allowed him to see something extraordinary in the 
narration of his patient.7 This type of peculiar process can be described using 
6 Ogden 2011, 21. Also, compare Ogden 1994.
7 Ogden 2011, 143–146. 
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the notion of the analytic third which neither fully belongs to the patient nor the 
analyst, and which can be overtly filled with the symbolic and bizarre shopping 
dream, “real” shopping story, and the analyst’s memories. 
I suggest taking a similar look at Heracles (this may prove valuable for other 
literary works, too). Euripides the author enters into a certain “dialogue” with 
an imagined spectator, and creates a tragedy (to make things easier, I will be 
writing about the “readers”). drama space becomes the analytic third in which 
the author expresses his unconscious fantasies together with his conscious ideas, 
feelings, and everything he is aware of in writing his piece. Euripides fills this 
metaphorical space both with persons who might be real persons in a similar 
situation (Megara, Amphitryon, Lycus, Theseus), and persons who are devoid 
of such “realness” (e.g. the goddesses Iris and Lyssa), as well as chorus songs. 
The chorus songs and appearance of the gods more resemble a dream told during 
the session, while actions of persons – a realistic story. One way or another, in 
choosing and modifying a specific myth or historic setting, taking advantage of 
a tradition, making literary references, alluding to political events, conveying his 
own philosophical views, Euripides shares with the reader his own unconscious, 
which is symbolically expressed in the mentioned conscious content.8 
Such a methodological approach allows us, as philologists examining the 
text, to be free enough – in deciding to provide a psychological interpretation – to 
neither restrict ourselves to an analysis of stage characters treated as realistically 
presented persons, nor treat them solely as projections of some fantasy. Hence, 
anything that happens within the space of the drama’s analytic third (and the 
philologist’s contribution, both conscious and unconscious, is present here, 
too) is subject to reflection and analysis, be it the behaviour or statement of a 
specific character, or the chorus lyrical song, or a motif that keeps recurring in 
an intriguing way at different moments of the tragedy. 
I suggest taking this look at Euripidean Heracles. This method will assume 
an analysis of the metaphorical space of the work as the “mind” or the “subject”, 
which manifests itself both through statements and behaviour of individualised 
characters, and literary aspects of the text (style, rhetoric, composition, selection 
of motifs). If we fully follow this analogy to the analytic third of the therapeutic 
8 According to a “biographical model” as referred to by Paweł dybel (dybel 2009) which is 
presently abandoned in the psychoanalytically-oriented western literary studies, one could seek 
in the biographical testimonies on Euripides any clues of such identity organisation, in which 
the psychotic part is highlighted to a considerable extent. Albin Lesky writes: “Euripides was 
supposedly little sociable, rather taciturn, always engrossed in his thoughts, repulsive. Let us add 
to this an account from a grotto in Salamis, shown already during the Empire times; the poet 
looking at the distant sea, far from crowd noise, mused there over the mysteries of human soul. 
True or not, this picture fits well the image of artist ousted from the life of the community” (Lesky 
2006, 316). Although this description corresponds to some features of schizoid, or even paranoid, 
personality, it would be naive considering it as any material confirming Euripides’ “diagnosis.” 
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relationship, then one has to allow for the influence which the work exerts on 
the reader’s sensitivity. This last element appears to go hazardously beyond the 
“scholarly” framework of the tragedy’s philological analysis; however, it can 
hardly be denied that interpretation of a literary work is to some extent influenced 
by the scholar’s individuality (including the unconscious) determining, among 
other things, what they observe in the text, how they use their knowledge, and to 
which elements they react more and which less.9 
It’s worth referring the methods proposed by me to conceptions presented 
by Norman Holland, one of the most prominent exponents of Anglo-Saxon 
psychoanalytic literary studies.10 Holland emphasises that psychoanalysis is 
always a method of getting to know the mind, not the text, and that in the case of 
literature there exist three minds: that of the author, that of the reader, and that of 
the “person in the text.” He perceives the existence of three approaches within 
psychoanalytic literary criticism: the first one comes from Freud, and is related 
to the analysis of the author’s mind, the second one treats the text as mind, and 
the third one deals with the reader’s mind and the way literary text impacts it. 
The latter trend represents the method proposed by Holland (reader-response 
criticism). I would locate this application of Ogden’s conception of the “third” 
for text interpretation closest to the second approach distinguished by Holland 
(text as mind). However, the approach I propose also includes in the analysis, 
to some extent, the author’s and the reader’s minds as subjects co-creating the 
intersubjective space of the work.11 
This does not appear to be so much distinct from what analytic therapists do: 
listening and construing the patient through their human sensitivity; however, 
 9 In respect of Heracles, one can see a number of interesting symptoms of such a personal attitu-
de of scholars towards the text. Chalk, for instance, claims that what testifies to willamowitz’s false 
interpretation is not only strictly scholarly arguments, but also (which he repeats after Parmentier and 
Ehrenberg) “the predominant impression we derive” (Chalk 1962, 12). Apparently, however, willa-
mowitz must have gotten a totally different “impression” than Chalk, possessing a similar knowledge 
and scholarly techniques. Chalk gives willamowitz’s conception a slightly mocking name (“Heracles 
the Megalomaniac”). Another example is emotional expressions, used to describe Heracles, begin-
ning from “grotesque abortion” by Swinburne, quoted by Verrall (1905) and “broken-backed” by 
Murray (1946, 112). divergent and emotional reaction of various authors to Heracles will be addres-
sed in the fourth section of this article. 
10 As regards the details of the conception briefly discussed here – compare Holland 1993, 
5–21 and Holland 1998, 1203–1211. 
11 Both classic “modernist” approach by Freud (which dybel calls “biographical model”, 
see note 8), and “postmodernist” approach of Holland himself, based on different reactions that 
this text evokes in readers in contact with their unconsciousness, appear rather extreme, and in 
any case, difficult to apply in classical philologist’s techniques. The method presented in this 
article is far from Holland’s “structuralist” vision of the text as the mind isolated from the author 
and the reader; admittedly, it takes into account the author’s historic mind and reactions of the 
modern reader (manly those of the scholar who examines the text), however, what’s central for the 
considerations is the text as a form of crystallising the unconscious mental process.
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they do not confine themselves to this, but transform their experience into the 
language of theory, before – back to colloquial language – they pass something 
down to the patient. The classical philologists also read the text construing it as 
a human being through their intellectual and emotional sensitivity; still though, 
they do not confine themselves to this, but confront it with their scientific 
knowledge, and communicate the conclusions as well, albeit in a theoretical 
language, not a colloquial one. The method applied in this article differs only in 
that beside the philological knowledge it also uses psychoanalytic knowledge to 
give meaning to the text. 
2. UNdERSTANdING PSYCHOSIS IN kLEINIANISM
Among many conceptions of psychosis developed within psychoanalysis, 
one of the most influential is a theory of Melanie klein. I will use her views to 
interpret Heracles, and make occasional references to her most famous disciples: 
Hanna Segal, wilfred Bion or Herbert Rosenfeld. In the following section, I will 
briefly present the most important notions to be used for text analysis. due to the 
very brief character of this presentation, interested readers can be referred to the 
elaborations or source texts of kleinianism.12 
Fundamental for this approach to psychosis are the notions of paranoid-
schizoid position and depressive position introduced by klein in the 1930s and 
1940s. “Position” in klein’s theory means a configuration of feelings, fantasies, 
fears, and defences against them. In other words, it is an unconscious method 
of perceiving and experiencing oneself and the world. The paranoid-schizoid 
position develops during the first months of baby’s life as a method of organising 
its experiences outside the perfectly safe mother’s womb. After leaving her womb, 
in which the baby experienced a condition of instant gratification and general 
homeostasis, it must struggle for the first time with frustration caused by pain, cold 
or hunger. From the beginning, the baby is accompanied by the most primitive 
human fear, which is an annihilating fear, i.e. fear of decay or destruction of the 
psyche by destructive forces attacking from the inside. klein claims that the baby 
experiences the annihilating fear mainly due to a death instinct that’s present in it.
The mechanisms occurring already in the paranoid-schizoid position (and 
later on performing an important function) are projection and introjection.13 
These are mechanisms-fantasies related to excretion and evacuation or suction 
12 Apart from the edition of the writings of Melanie klein (klein 2007b), worth mentioning is 
a classic presentation of Hanna Segal (Segal 2005). 
13 The below sketch of conceptions is based on a classic article: M. klein, uwagi na temat 
niektórych mechanizmów schizoidalnych (1946), In: klein 2007b, 1–16. References to analytic 
articles, in accordance with the quoting tradition, are given according to the original text 
publication. 
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and swallowing respectively. during the process of introjection, the baby’s 
mind “swallows” a good object and places it in the internal world, where it 
becomes a source of life and safety. At the same time, the baby introjects the 
terrifying bad object, and then tries to get rid of it in the process of projection 
by throwing it out. The baby’s first and fundamental object is the mother’s 
breast. However, from the outset it is split into a good breast (gratifying) and 
bad breast (frustrating). The good breast is used as a source of life, good, love, 
calm, and safety, while the bad breast is a terrifying cause of evil, suffering, 
hatred, and destruction. The baby’s psychic organ is so weakly developed that 
its experiences in the paranoid-schizoid position are almost totally dominated by 
unconscious fantasies which distort reality (e.g. the real quality of motherly care 
and breastfeeding). Unconscious fantasies are psychic representations of two 
drives – life (creation, love) and death (destruction, aggression). 
Introjection of the good breast is particularly important, as it creates the core 
of the ego, foundation of safety. It is a seed of subsequent feeling that I exist, I 
have the right to live, be loved and love. On the other hand, the relationship with 
the bad breast causes a central fear of the paranoid-schizoid position, which is 
persecutory fear. The good breast is absorbed in fantasies, and the bad breast 
is attacked in oral and cannibalistic fantasies of biting, tearing, devouring, etc. 
The baby separately maintains the good and the bad object, and related feelings 
by means of the splitting mechanism; therefore in states of gratification love 
is directed solely to the good gratifying breast, and in states of frustration, it is 
directed solely to the bad frustrating breast, which reflexively causes persecutory 
fear (of revenge from the bad breast).
Another mechanism is an omnipotent control, which is the basis of any 
internal operations at this early stage of development (and later on in individuals 
suffering from psychological disorders). Idealisation of the object consists in 
ascribing to the good breast extremely positive features by associating it with 
fantasies of total gratification. So the idealised breast is then omnipotently 
resorted to for protection against the persecuting breast. This is accompanied 
by another mechanism: denial of psychic reality that consists in magical non-
recognition of the existence of the persecutory object and the aggression drive. 
Finally, thanks to the projective identification mechanism currently considered 
as one of klein’s key discoveries, the baby places in the object the split, bad 
parts of itself (the self), thus omnipotently controlling it, and at the same time 
becomes bound with this object in a strong relationship based on hatred and 
fear. 
To make the processes in question clearer, we can imagine a several-month-
old baby which wakes up hungry at night. It experiences hunger as a strong pain 
which it neither knows nor understands, because its psyche is not mature enough 
to imagine its mother as a person, and create in itself a feeling that she will 
soon come and feed it. The baby feels attacked from the inside by something or 
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somebody indefinite, and its reaction is fear and rage. The baby experiences this 
situation in fantasy as a contact with persecutory object(s). In sadistic fantasies, 
the baby attacks the bad breast by tearing it, crushing it, and violently projecting 
into it its own aggression together with its urine and faeces.14 This projection 
of aggression into the breast reflexively intensifies the persecutory fear, as now 
the bad breast filled with aggressive parts of the self turns against the baby in 
fantasies to take revenge.15 Because of the splitting mechanism, the good object, 
including its related positive emotions, are totally inaccessible to the baby at this 
moment, so its world turns into hell. Apart from placing in the breast the split 
parts of the self, and exerting omnipotent control over it, the baby can only make 
use of hallucinatory gratification, i.e. calling up of the ideal object (accompanied 
by thumb-sucking). 
Usually, after a while appears the mother. If the baby’s aggression is not 
pathologically intensified, it calms down after a while, and the internal image of 
the object changes from persecutory into good. The baby starts sucking, its hunger 
vanishes and its internal world changes dramatically. Although objectively, it is 
being fed by the same breast and the same mother, the baby now has access to 
the positive part of its relationship with the object, and in its fantasy any evil 
has been removed from the world by the omnipotent saviour, the ideal breast. 
The baby has moved in its fantasies from the hell of hatred to the paradise of 
love. However, when hunger comes back or when the baby has a wet diaper, the 
previous conditions return.
The other position presented by klein is the depressive position. It appears 
with the development of the baby’s brain and psyche, when it is able to introject 
its mother as a whole object, as opposed to the earlier partial objects (breast, 
face, hands, etc.). Introjection and establishment of the entire good object 
(mother) inside means appearance of another fear – a depressive one. It is fear of 
the fact that aggressive attacks which so far have only destroyed the bad breast 
in fantasy, and which resulted in fear of revenge from it, now are not directed 
towards the hostile object any more, but towards the loved mother who feeds, 
loves and cares for the baby. The splitting is getting weaker, while two drives, 
love and aggression, are approaching each other, just as good and bad aspects 
of the object and the self. Because in the internal world desire means acting, the 
baby really destroys its good object in its fantasies. New feelings emerge in it: 
14 kleinians differentiate a healthier mechanism of neurotic projection onto the object, which 
consists in ascribing to the object the features of the self, from projection into the object, which is 
generally an identification projection, i.e. placing in the object parts of the self in such a way that 
the object begins behaving towards the self the same way the self behaves towards the object. In 
the latter instance, as was later observed, patients provoke the therapist non-verbally to play the 
role in accordance with the projection. 
15 “An innate characteristic of the experience of persecution is the fact that it is simultaneously 
reinforced by hatred, and itself reinforces hatred.” (klein 1940, 354, 363). 
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pain of loss, deep sorrow, and a feeling of guilt due to its own aggressiveness. 
The baby is experiencing its first grief.
klein argued that if in the baby’s internal world death drive predominates 
over life drive, and there is more hatred than love, then the persecutory fear 
still prevails, and the depressive position experiences become unbearable. 
The coming together of good and evil terrifies; therefore, the baby intensifies 
splitting instead of ignoring it. The baby can then perform regression to the 
earlier paranoid-schizoid position, protecting itself from experiencing grief and 
guilt. This is exactly a paradox of psychosis, where the fear of destruction of 
the self by the bad object is easier to bear than the pain of the self due to the 
fact that it has destroyed the good object. Breaking up with reality in favour of 
illusion which seems to prevent suffering impoverishes the psyche, and causes 
destructive disease. This painful paradox is rendered by a statement of wilfred 
Bion, sometimes quoted, addressed to one of his patients: “It’s a pity you have 
restricted yourself to omnipotence.”16 
Such a failure in working out the depressive position according to klein leads 
to psychotic disorders of various types and degrees of intensification. working 
it out means first of all admitting feelings of pain, sadness and guilt, and then 
undertaking a so-called reparation, i.e. activity (also taking place in fantasy, but 
represented in the child’s play) of “repairing”, i.e. reproducing and rebuilding 
the object destroyed in fantasy, and making up for its own aggressive impulses. 
The ability of object reparation is a source of subsequent creative abilities and 
the skill of loving. working out the depressive situation also enables a process of 
symbol creation and symbolic thinking, as well as a more objective perception 
of reality. The baby perceives the mother in a more real and multidimensional 
manner (just like itself), differentiates between the world of fantasy and the real 
world, and establishes in itself a lasting good object that gives it a feeling of 
safety. 
Hanna Segal and wilfred Bion focused on differences between psychotic and 
non-psychotic “thinking.” Segal claimed that the ability of using the symbol in 
the full meaning of the word requires an ability to tell the self from the object, 
external reality as distinct from internal reality, as only then does there exist a 
sense that the symbol and what’s symbolised (this originally being the object) 
are both different from each other and related with each other. what resembles 
the symbols in the thinking of persons with psychological disorders whom Segal 
worked with, was called by her, by contrast, “symbolic equation.” This means 
that a psychotic person gives the impression that they use words and symbols in 
communication, while in reality the words and symbols they use do not mean 
things – they are things. An example often brought up by Segal refers to one of 
her patients who used to be a violinist before he came down with schizophrenia. 
16 Quoted after Ogden 2010, 106.
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when the doctor asked him why he had stopped playing since he had become ill, 
he replied abruptly: “why? do you expect me to masturbate in public?”17
3. PARANOId-SCHIzOId PROCESSES IN HeRACLes 
The first part of Heracles is dominated by processes characteristic of the 
paranoid-schizoid position. In the prologue, there is a very clear persecutory 
image of Lycus. Heracles’ father – like Megara and Heracles himself – perceive 
Lycus in a totally bad manner; he has no positive feature. we know from allusions 
that Amphitryon himself has destructive impulses because he killed his failed 
father-in-law, Alcmene’s father, and justifies twice the infanticide committed 
for political reasons (39–40 and 206–7), in a similar manner to that of Lycus 
(165–9).18 In Amphitryon’s relationship with Lycus and that with his internal 
image, one can see an instance of the projective identification mechanism and its 
related paranoid vicious circle. Amphitryon is in a situation of total helplessness 
and weakness, he tries to control the object omnipotently by placing in it his own 
split bad parts. However, the bigger Amphitryon’s hatred (self) to Lycus (object), 
the more the image of Lycus becomes hostile, and the greater fear it raises in 
Amphitryon. Still, Amphitryon, getting rid of his own aggression, experiences 
himself as helpless. Euripides conveys the projective identification by means of 
a rhetorical φόνῳ σβέσῃ φόνον (41). 
At the same time, in response to the persecutory fear there appears an 
omnipotent reference to the ideal object. klein writes: “States of frustration or 
fear force the baby to flee from its persecutors into its internal, idealised object.”19 
It’s zeus, with a telling nickname “the saviour”, who becomes this object (σωτήρ 
48). The altar of zeus, at which Amphitryon took shelter, apparently merges 
with the ideal object in his experience, thus making up a “symbolic equation.” 
This sitting at the altar is supposed to ensure Amphitryon protection from the 
persecutory object, which later on turns out to be ineffective. Amphitryon also 
combines in this symbol not only zeus, but also Heracles, who had built the 
altar, which is another example of magical thinking (48–50). Amphitryon feels 
as if he were drawing on the power of the object by sitting at the altar.
whereas the combination Lycus/zeus-Heracles represents the mechanism 
of splitting the object into ideal/persecutory, the dialogue of Amphitryon and 
Megara expresses a complementary splitting of the self.20 Megara symbolises 
17 This conception and the example come from: Segal 2006, 78. 
18 Compare, Chalk 1962, 17. 
19 klein 1946, 10. 
20 “The baby splits the object and the self in fantasy, but the result of this fantasy is very real, 
as what it leads to is that feelings and emotions (and subsequently thinking processes) get cut away 
from one another.” (klein 1946, 7). 
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here a weak, depressed aspect of the self, which has totally abandoned the hope 
(85–106), persecuted by ominous Lycus. Amphitryon represents the self, which 
tries to identify itself with the ideal object (zeus – altar – Heracles). Megara 
can’t stand the waiting for rescue. what’s interesting, Megara says earlier that 
in telling stories she tries to divert the children’s attention away from their 
father’s absence, and Amphitryon tells her to continue doing this. One could 
wonder whether Megara’s activity (which appears to be strictly intertwined with 
what she experiences together with Amphitryon) is dominated by the psychotic 
part of her personality, or represents a more mature form of her thinking. True 
symbolic thinking means evoking the presence of mother (based on the internal 
good object) by a symbol – image, word or thing, which substitute for her. Bion 
describes this process as the appearance of thoughts out of a painful void of the 
“missing breast.” However, if thinking is not developing, instead, we do not 
have a symbol, but hallucination, ideal object, magical thinking, which protect 
from an attack of the bad object.21 
The general mood of the scene in question inclines one to preferably admit 
that both Megara and Amphitryon rely on denial, splitting, etc., rather than more 
mature thinking. Megara herself is unable to evoke in herself any support, and 
what’s more, she attributes all her longing to her children and Amphitryon by 
means of projective identification. She sees in her children her longing, which 
hurts her; therefore she lies to them by saying something she doesn’t believe 
herself. Amphitryon has his own “hope” based on his retreating into his omnipotent 
fantasies, but he is scared by watching Magara’s and the children’s despair, so 
he talks her into calming them down by lying. These aspects are emphasised by 
Euripides through repetitions of κλέπτειν and κλοπή in Amphitryon’s utterance 
(99–100).
In the first epeisodion, Lycus finally appears on the stage, about whom we 
have only just heard. Lycus derisively attacks zeus and Heracles, who are the 
only point of reference for Amphitryon, by undermining the value of his labours, 
and suggesting that he had completed them not using his power or mind, but 
deception (151–155). Amphitryon undertakes to defend Heracles, and in the 
agon of the two characters a schizoid oscillation between omnipotent referencing 
the ideal object (Heracles as invincible victor), and equally hostile devaluation 
of his character as a crook and false hero reveals itself. 
In these agons, first between Megara and Amphitryon, and later on between 
Amphitryon and Lycus, we are dealing with two perspectives at a time. In 
individual utterances of each character can be found psychotic features, some 
sort of loss of contact with reality in favour of fantasy. However, when we see 
them all at the same time in a metaphorical space of the drama, in the combining 
them by Euripides, the clarity of splitting and denial mechanisms reveals itself. 
21 Bion 2010, 74–75. 
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The characters do not experience both the positive and negative features of any 
person. Heracles is either an ideal saviour or a crook, Lycus is a monster, Megara 
is solitary and resigned, and Amphitryon naively believes in rescue. Each of 
these persons demonstrates another part of the shattered psyche – the object or 
the self.22 
Another aspect of splitting, this time notable not on the stage, but in 
the utterance of one of the characters, is the devaluation of zeus made by 
Amphitryon, when no rescue comes. Amphitryon takes away zeus’ attributes, 
which he earlier has ascribed to him (1–2 and 48–50), taking pride in that he 
had shared his wife, and taking shelter at his alter. Now he says: ὦ Ζεῦ, μάτην 
ἄρ᾿ ὁμόγαμόν σ᾿ ἐκτησάμην/ μάτην δὲ παιδὸς κοινεῶν᾿ ἐκλῄζομην·/ σὺ δ᾿ 
ἦσθ’ ἄρ᾿ ἧσσον ἢ δόκεις εἶναι φίλος./ ἀρετῇ σε νικῶ θνητὸς ὢν θεὸν μέγαν·/ 
παῖδας γὰρ οὐ προύδωκα τοὺς Ἡρακλέους./σὺ δ᾿ ἐς μὲν εὐνὰς κρύφιος ἠπίστω 
μολεῖν/ τἀλλότρια λέκτρα δόντος οὐδενὸς λαβών/ σῴζειν δὲ τοὺς οὐκ ἐπίστασαι 
φίλους./ ἀμαθής τις εἶ θεὸς ἢ δίκαοις οὐκ ἔφυς. (339–47).23 Now, the same zeus 
is experienced by Amphitryon in an extremely different way – as treacherous, 
greedy, one who by abuse and with no permission had appropriated someone 
else’s wife, and finally, also helpless, stupid or unjust.
Here, for the first time in tragedy appears a phenomenon which klein 
developed towards the end of her life, calling it greed and envy.24 “Envy is a 
sense of anger at the fact that somebody else has and enjoys having something 
desirable, and gives an impulse to take it away or damage [it]” – writes klein, 
and “greed is a violent and insatiable endeavour exceeding what the subject 
needs, and what the object can, and is ready to give. (…) Envy aims not only at 
robbing in this way, its objective is also to place bad things, mainly bad faeces, 
and bad parts of oneself in the mother, and primarily in her breast to damage it 
or destroy it in this way.”25 The situation of a lack of the sense of safety, love 
and good intensifies greed and persecutory fear, and stimulates fantasy of the 
inexhaustible breast which has everything that the subject desires the most, yet 
refuses to give it to the subject, withholding the love and the good for itself. This 
22 Hamilton (1985, 20) specifically analyses the devaluation made by Lycus, but also 
demonstrates how Megara and Amphitryon artificially raise their self-esteem (“their exaggerated 
sense of self-worth”) based on their relationship with Heracles. 
23 “zeus, it does no good that you were my wife’s lover, no good that I have called you sharer 
in my son’s begetting. You were, it now appears, not as near a friend as I thought. In goodness 
I, though mortal, surpass you, a mighty god. I have not abandoned the children of Heracles. But 
you, though you know well enough how to slip secretly into bed and take other men’s wives when 
no one has given you permission, do not know how to save the lives of your nearest and dearest. 
Either you are a fool of a god or there is no justice in your nature.” Text according to Teubner’s 
edition (Lepizig, 1988), translation from kovacs’s Loeb edition (Cambridge – London, 1998).
24 klein 1957, 185–245 in klein 2007b
25 klein 1957, 190. 
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arouses envy, i.e. a desire to rob the ideal breast of its riches, and to aggressively 
fill it with toxic faeces (bad parts of the self). 
This corresponds exactly to what Amphitryon does with relation to zeus. 
First, his persecutory fear of Lycus grows, and the prolonging abandonment 
turns into despair. Amphitryon experiences the same condition which earlier 
was displayed by Megara – hopelessness, resignation and despair, which 
Euripides emphasises by anaphoric double μάτην… μάτην. In such a suffering, 
Amphitryon stops searching for care in the ideal object, and what awakes in him 
is a hidden-under-idealisation envy of happiness, power and love, which zeus 
has, and which he keeps to himself without helping him. 
Therefore, in his fantasy Amphitryon robs zeus of some of his attributes 
(virtue, fairness, and wisdom), and projects into zeus his own weak, helpless 
and bad parts (symbolic toxic faeces), which results in Amphitryon experiencing 
himself as more virtuous and wiser than zeus. The ideal breast is “damaged”, 
filled with split psychic “faeces”, which unfortunately does not improve his 
situation. Apart from the fact that Amphitryon triumphs in his fantasy over 
the object (σε νικῶ θνητὸς ὢν), in reality, he destroys the source of good and 
love by his aggressive projective identification.
It seems intentional that just after such devaluation of a divine saviour – 
zeus, the chorus in the first stasimon introduces an idealised character of a 
human saviour – Heracles, extolling his twelve labours. zeus stops fulfilling the 
function of the ideal object in the space of the drama, and the rising fear of Lycus 
requires defence in the form of idealisation and denial. That’s why the chorus 
omnipotently establishes another ideal object – Heracles in lieu of devaluated 
zeus. 
The chorus in tragedy is particularly an exponent of unconscious space of 
the drama. The language of chorus songs and the method of imaging is strongly 
affected by psychotic features. Chorus songs represent dream in tragedy (or 
rather, according to Bion’s theory, “night hallucinations”, because a psychotic 
person is not able to dream in a symbolic manner), in contrast to a more realistic 
interaction between characters, which corresponds to being awake. This specific 
quality of dream/hallucinations of chorus songs is only announced in the parodos, 
where the chorus says: ἔπεα μόνον καὶ δόκημα νυκτερω-/ πὸν ἐννύχων ὀνείρων 
(111–112). The chorus is fit for such a role also because it is a collective entity 
as opposed both to the characters, and e.g. the Messenger who carries out his 
observations from a more objective position.
As regards the first stasimon addressed here, Shirley Barlow brilliantly 
analyses the unrealistic language, in which there is an astonishing avoidance 
of phraseology which might have aggressive and brutal connotations during the 
description of Heracles’ labours. In total contrast to the style and imaging of 
the chorus stands the Messenger’s description, brutal in its precision. Barlow 
demonstrates that Euripides begins with fantasy, gradually moving towards 
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reality.26 what the author calls “planes of reality”, at the psychological level 
refers on the one hand to the world of omnipotent fantasies, and on the other hand 
to the real word. The chorus is here an extreme representative of the first world, 
with one exception – the hallucinatory and delusional episode of Heracles. 
Beside the unrealistic tone of the chorus songs, its important feature is 
avoiding brutality. It results from the fact that the labours extolled by the chorus 
are manifestations of the ideal object, split and omnipotently established for 
protection from persecutory fear. The chorus represents here a mechanism which 
klein (after Freud) calls hallucinatory gratification. She writes: “The main 
processes present in idealisation, namely splitting of the object and denial of 
both frustration and persecution, also act in hallucinatory gratification. The ego 
not only keeps the hallucinatory and persecutory object away from the idealised 
object, but goes further by denying its existence just like the entire situation of 
frustration and bad feelings (pain), which result from it. (...) denial of psychic 
reality is only possible due to a strong sense of omnipotence which is an 
essential feature of early mentality (…). Therefore, in hallucinatory gratification 
take place two mutually related processes: omnipotent establishment of the ideal 
object, and equally omnipotent annihilation of both the bad persecutory object 
and the painful situation.”27 
The chorus song makes evident these primitive psychic phenomena step 
by step. The chorus begins with a mood of despair, saying that it should sing 
αἴλινον after Heracles’ death (348), it totally ignores the fear of death from 
Lycus growing on stage, and states that instead it wants to extol Heracles’ 
labours (θέλω 356). This way, the chorus keeps the persecutory object away 
from the idealised one – Lycus and the deadly threat disappear from the stage, 
and the readers are invited to immerse themselves in the chorus’ hallucinatory 
images. The chorus denies the existence of evil by omnipotent annihilation of the 
bad objects made symbolically by Heracles, who subjugates or kills monsters. 
In the sons dominates a sense of the main character’s omnipotence and his ideal 
nature – in principle, he is not a human being, but god.28 Barlow also points out 
26 “Each mode represents a different plane of reality: one remote, romantic, decorative 
(adjectivally oriented), the other close, grimly unsentimental, ugly (verbally oriented).” (Barlow 
1982, 121).
27 klein 1946, 7–8. 
28 Barlow (1982, 117) writes: “The absence of Heracles is not merely the absence of an ordinary 
man but of an almost superhuman hero of whom miracles in the past have been expected.” The 
mood of the stasimon does not escape the attention of Sheppard, who sees in it a combination of 
two characters: Lycus and Heracles, as well as the fact that Heracles appears to be a god, in which 
the author senses an unclear threat. what’s interesting is that Sheppard immediately backs down 
on the observation of Heracles’ “superhuman greatness”, and states that we must “ignore the 
lyrics”, because after all Heracles must be a fully human character, and not idealised and irregular 
(Barlow 1982, 76–78). Chalk (1962, 17) perceives in the first part a generally “melodramatic” 
combination of utterly differently seen good and evil, but only tries to explain it towards the end 
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that the song is generally made up of loosely related images which have neither 
logical nor temporal order. This appears to be the third of the psychotic aspects 
of this stasimon.29 
It’s worth saying more about the symbolism of Hades, to which Heracles is 
said to irrevocably have gone (427–429), and who appears at the end of the song. 
Hades may mean a world of inner fantasies as opposed to the sunny, real world 
of the earth, similar to the human-divine opposition. Heracles’ descent to Hades 
can thus be interpreted as a psychotic breaking up with reality and immersion in 
the world of omnipotent fantasies (which, in parallel, to a lesser extent is shared 
by Amphitryon and Megara, and undoubtedly the chorus). It is also a portent of 
subsequent madness which will afflict Heracles himself.
what’s interesting is that the scholars do not comment at all on the symbolism 
of Hades in discussing this stasimon. However, what doesn’t escape their 
attention is a more visible compositional technique of Euripides, who in Heracles 
astonishingly reverses the generally accepted mythic sequence of events (first 
madness, then the labours as atonement). A similar sequence modification is 
present in the chorus song – irrevocable entrance into Hades after completion of 
the labours may symbolise immersion in madness and turning of the whole good 
into ruin. At the end of the song returns the negative mood of the first verses, 
only deeper. In the chorus utterances appear images related to emptiness and 
lack of good objects (στέγαι δ᾿ ἔρεμοι φίλων, 430, ἄθεον ἄδικον, 433–434, οὐ 
παρόντος 435). 
In the second epeisodion, this mood of impending decay and disintegration 
of the psyche is continued as a result of attacks of the bad object. In this extreme 
situation appears an interesting trading of roles between Megara and Amphitryon. 
Megara, who had been devoid of hope, now calls on Heracles to save them 
(490–496). Now, it’s she and not Amphitryon who omnipotently establishes the 
ideal object, which is to protect the self from persecutions and destruction. Her 
words echo the chorus song as there appear in them elements of hallucinatory 
gratification as well. Megara calls on Heracles to – metaphorically – brighten 
up the darkness (σκιὰ φάνηθί μοι), and her desire of omnipotent protection from 
evil is fulfilled in a hallucinatory manner, as in a dream (ἅλις γὰρ ἐλθὼν κἂν 
ὄναρ γένοιο σύ, 495). Amphitryon also takes shelter by idealising the object, 
and, what’s interesting, he calls for help once again from the idealised figure 
of zeus (498–500), although previously it had been the object of his envious 
attack. This, however, doesn’t produce the expected results, and after a while 
of his article, after complicated analyses of the third part, as Euripides’ warning against excessive 
focusing on what’s good, as this can lead to overlooking irrational forces. Silk claims that Heracles 
is a character suspended between the sphere of the gods and that of human beings, he is neither 
fully divine nor fully human. However, in the case of the chorus song in question: “god-heroic 
aspect was amplified” (Silk 1985, 13). 
29 “Time does not matter. Order does not matter.” (Barlow 1982, 118). 
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Amphitryon returns to the attitude of the abandoned and weak self, which earlier 
had been expressed by Megara, as he talks about futility (μάτην πονῶ 501), and 
falls into despair.
Then, Heracles appears on the stage. Although this is a moment in which 
he “materialises” on the stage in a way, his realness to some extent remains 
as if a dreamy one. It is suggested by the language used in the beginning by 
Euripides. Megara describes Heracles as if he were a dream (εἰ μή γ᾿ ὄνειρον ἐν 
φάει τι λεύσσομεν/ τί φημί; ποῖ᾿ ὄνειρα κηραίνουσ᾿ ὁρῶ; 517–518). Moreover, 
she equals him omnipotently with zeus, the saviour (521–522). On the stage 
appears not so much Heracles – the real man, but Heracles – the ideal hero from 
the previous chorus fantasies. Euripides again trades the roles of Amphitrion and 
Megara. Now Heracles’ father uses the metaphor of light (ὦ φάος μολὼν πατρί, 
531), and Megara emphasises once again the divine attribute of the saviour 
(ἐσώθης 533). 
Heracles identifies himself with Amphitryon’s and Megara’s omnipotent 
idealisations by delivering a euphoric speech, in which he himself sees himself 
as a powerful saviour who is able to destroy persecutory objects, and protect 
both the good objects and the self (first of all, his own children, but also his wife 
and father: 562–282). Heracles’ utterance is a catalogue of sadistic fantasies, 
oral, anal, urethral and phallic in character.30 There appear images of destroying 
a palace (tearing the breast apart), beheading (biting off the nipple), throwing 
to the dogs (oral biting and devouring), crushing with a club (the aggressive 
phallus), piercing with arrows (anal faecal “bullets”), and poisoning a river with 
blood (poisoning the bad breast with toxic urine). 
By surrendering to these fantasies, Heracles is not in contact with reality, 
and Amphytryon is trying to restore this contact (588–594). His son experiences 
sadistic attacks on the bad object, which reflexively intensify persecutory fear. 
If Heracles attacked Lycus according to his impulsive plan, he would get killed 
by Lycus’s supporters that were numerous in the city (the bad object undergoes 
fragmentation, and attacks in the form of a whole mass of enemies, “bizarre 
objects”, as Bion called them, containing split parts of the broken self”). This 
moment is another portent of Heracles’ madness, who – though coming back 
from Hades – is still symbolically imprisoned in it to some extent.31 
30 Oral sadism means fantasies relating to sucking out, biting off, tearing apart, emptying, and 
robbing the mother’s breast/body. Anal and urethral means throwing away with faeces/urine of the 
bad parts of the self and their related aggression, which faeces are supposed to damage the object 
or take possession of it. Fantasies of bad split phallus appear, according to klein, as early as in 
the paranoid-schizoid position, where there is still no realistic relationship with the father as an 
overall object.
31 The scene in question was for willamowitz, Murray, dodds and Grube a basis for discerning 
earlier signs of madness in Heracles (see Chalk 1962, 8–9). Verrall (1905, 156) here describes 
Heracles as “verging on delirium.” . According to Burnett (1971, 165) Heracles speech is 
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The second stasimon (655–672), like the previous one, makes up a series of 
loosely related images (“Time does not matter. Order does not matter.”32), and 
reflects the unconscious psychotic process taking place in the drama space.33 
The chorus again begins with the sense of persecution, the bad object being old 
age whose burden resembles Etna rocks in fantasies, crushing down on the head 
and covering up the eyes with darkness (incidentally, what’s interesting is the 
implication of these metaphors as they seemingly correspond to likely fear of 
the baby in contact with the breast that crushes down on the baby). Then, the 
chorus sadistically fantasises about attacks on the “murderous” object (λυγρὸν 
φόνιόν τε γῆρας μισῶ 649–650).  In the projective identification the self merges 
with the object so that both old age destroys the chorus and the chorus destroys 
old age, which is emphasised by one expression matching both parties of the 
relationship (φόνιον). The chorus destroys the object my drowning it in waves, 
which constitutes an urethral fantasy (κατὰ κυμάτων δ᾿ ἔρροι 651–652).34 
Then, in an attempt to protect from the growing sense of persecution resulting 
from the projective identification, the chorus omnipotently denies the existence 
of time and human- condition limitations. The idealised self, full of virtues, will 
be revived and young, like the idealised Heracles who returned from the land 
of death.35 This idealisation of the self is not only related to the desire to protect 
oneself from the bad object, but also with envy at the good object. The chorus, 
unable to tolerate the power and happiness of the gods, tries to enviously rob 
and devalue them. It suggests that they are not fair and wise enough since they 
do not grant double youth to virtuous people (655–658). what operates here is a 
primitive envy through which the chorus wants to suck out from the gods their 
“unusually indiscriminate in its ferocity”. Silk (1985, 12–13) proves that both the psychological 
posture, and the language used resemble a typical god’s speech in tragedies and epics, though he 
does not regard it as a hint of coming madness. Lesky (2006, 429), in the support given by the 
chorus leader to Heracles’ “wild speech” sees an argument against Heracles’ growing madness. 
32 See note 27. 
33 Parry (1965, 363–364) writes that many scholars emphasise the incoherence of this song. 
For instance, it is unclear whether the chorus expresses itself in it as a group of elders or as 
Euripides himself. Parry sees a considerable incoherence here that is based on a method of passing 
from the general to the particular, and formal resemblance to Pindar’s epinics.
34 Lesky (2006, 429) points out here that it is an imitation of a cult form apopompe, i.e. magic 
ritual of getting rid of bad things, e.g. by drowning them. Of course, it is difficult to consider a cult 
ritual as a symptom of psychosis, as psychosis is a rejection of culture and its “symbolic order”, 
but in primitive cultures can be seen mechanisms which appear in the paranoid-schizoid position, 
and which in adult persons of the western culture would point to psychotic features. In this case, 
this mechanism means using the symbolic equation and mass projective identification.
35 This idealising aspect is pointed out by Parry (1965, 364). The formal aspects of the song 
testify to that it is virtually a hymn to a god, and not to a human being. Pindar emphasises in 
the epinics that the character is not a god; here, this aspect is not present at all, and Heracles 
appears here precisely as a god: “the chorus elevate their hero to so dangerous a height that his fall 
becomes almost inevitable.”. This is also perceived by Silk (1985, 13). 
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eternal youth and freedom from death, their fairness and wisdom, and after the 
envious robbery from the ideal breast, the breast is filled with aggressive and 
bad aspects of the self. This allows the chorus – like earlier Amphitryon – to feel 
better than the gods, all the more so as in lieu of them it has found another ideal 
object – Heracles, whom it omnipotently establishes as a guardian. 
It’s also visible that the fear of the chorus also concerns the fact that there 
is no clear border between good and evil (by fault of the gods), and it would be 
conspicuous should the virtuous be granted another youth. There appears an 
image of sailors who cannot reach the stars because of the clouds. The chorus 
is afraid of the mutual approaching of love and aggression, and that of the good 
and the bad object (for fear of destruction of good by evil), with which it copes 
by intensification of the splitting.36 The second verse is again filled with a hymn 
to Heracles.37 In the antiverse, the chorus affirms that it will sing a paean for 
Apollo, such as for Heracles, which constitutes an idealising equation of the 
hero with the god. At the end of the song, the chorus exclaims that Heracles gave 
peaceful life to people by destroying dangerous beasts (θῆκεν βίοτον βροτοῖς/ 
πέρσας δείματα θηρῶν, 697–700). This stands in contradiction with the scene 
in which Heracles kills Lycus – bad, but after all, human, and announces an 
impending catastrophe. 
An almost idyllic mood of this chorus song contrasts with the mood of the 
next song, full of sadism. In the first antiverse, the chorus takes delight in the 
suffering and death of Lycus, just as Amphitryon had done this earlier, and 
considers Lycus’s ante-mortem groans as μέλος φίλιον (751–752). Sadistic 
μέλος of the chorus again reveals the splitting in relation to the ending of the 
previous song, primarily, because back there brutality and evil were magically 
removed from the world, and here the chorus rejoices in violence, secondly, 
back there the chorus enviously denigrated the gods, and here it announces that 
Lycus died fairly because he had claimed that gods had no power. These two 
aspects, aggression and envy, are continually split, denied, and then projected by 
both Amphitryon and the chorus. 
In the second antiverse, the chorus enters into an utterly different configuration 
of relationships with the object, because it omnipotently restores the function of 
ideal objects to the gods, seeing no discrepancy whatsoever in that not long ago 
it criticised them for not demonstrating the difference between good and evil. 
36 Parry (1965, 368) claims that it is simply a desire of the chorus to obtain a clear response on 
who is virtuous and who is not. 
37 This, according to Parry (1965, 372), is a solution to the central problem of this stasimon, 
that is – how to distinguish virtue from wickedness. The chorus affirms here that only Muses and 
Charities (poetic inspiration and beauty of the form) can demonstrate this difference by praising 
the virtue: “there remains one outstanding means whereby ἀρετή may be revealed, and that is 
through the power of song.”
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Now, it extols them for punishing evil and rewarding piety (773–780).38 In the 
third verse, the chorus again euphorically enjoys the world from which evil was 
magically removed, and then it invokes the earlier image of idealised divine-
human marriage which gave birth to Heracles. Here are revealed early fantasies 
related to the pair of parents described by klein. The marriage, in which a god 
and a human being share the bed with the same woman, constitutes a symbolic 
source of life by giving birth to a powerful saviour. The image is inadequately 
idealised, because what’s removed from it are any negative aspects, which 
after all appear both in the earlier accusation of Amphitrion, and in subsequent 
recognition of this marriage as a source of all misfortunes (as it had aroused 
Hera’s hatred towards Heracles: 1307–1309). The image of a marital bed which 
produced Heracles is subject to several omnipotent operations in the play. In 
moments of “frustration” it is experienced as perverse, treacherous and sadistic, 
and in moments of “gratification” it is sacred and giving birth to power. In 
addition, logic and relation with reality are denied, e.g. by the fact that Heracles 
after all cannot come from the semen of two males or that a love triangle (or 
in this case quadrangle) cannot be perceived by all those concerned as a good 
situation.39 
The first part of the tragedy, acknowledged by the scholars as melodramatic 
and difficult to associate with what follows, from the psychoanalytic perspective 
turns out to be a description of a psychotic process taking place in the analytic 
third of the drama, with fantasies, fears and defensive mechanisms characteristic 
of the paranoid-schizoid position. However, we do not observe an overt or 
acute psychosis, either in any characters or in the general organisation of the 
literary material. what happens preferably corresponds to processes occurring 
in a person endangered by psychosis, but who – for the time being – is coping 
with the unconscious fear by massive application of defensive mechanisms. The 
unrealistic nature and bizarreness of this part is seemingly integrally related 
with madness, being its portent and, partially, expression, and the description 
of Heracles’ madness that follows is hard to consider as something that appears 
unexpectedly and afflicts the totally sane Heracles. 
4. PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTINUITY IN HeRACLes
Although psychotic mechanisms are clearly present as early as in the first 
part of the tragedy, in the second part, they manifest themselves in a violent 
38 Harsh (1948, 202) perceives in it a tragic irony. 
39 This “dual parentage” is addressed in an article by J. d. Mikalson (1986), but although he 
describes these changing perceptions of the bed which produced Heracles, he fails to explain them 
in any way whatsoever.
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hallucinatory and delusional episode of Heracles. From the psychoanalytic 
perspective it does not constitute anything completely unexpected or coming 
totally from the outside, but is a culmination of the process growing previously. 
However, this is not the process referred to in willamowitz’s conception so 
strongly opposed.40 The view on Heracles’ madness (but without him to blame) 
was also expressed by Pohlenz and Verrall.41 
Another psychological approach was applied by kamerbeek, who formulated 
several cautious hypotheses to relate Heracles’ madness with the earlier parts of 
the tragedy, and his past in general. An argument in favour of such relations is for 
kamerbeek the already mentioned Euripides’ method consisting in intentional 
reversal of the labours-madness relation contrary to the known literary and 
mythic tradition. kamerbeek’s hypotheses are the following:42 (1) Heracles’ 
madness begins before Lyssa appears on the stage, (2) Heracles’ madness can 
be a violent reaction to the futility of the labours which had not contributed to 
ensuring safety to Heracles’ family, or it can result from his being overwhelmed 
by life’s hardships, and (3) the content of the hallucinations and delusions relates 
the madness with Heracles’ service with Eurystheus – the hero was angry at the 
king of Mycenae for putting his family at deadly risk, however he suppressed his 
desire to take revenge for rational reasons. when rational control broke down, 
the suppressed anger overtook Heracles and led him to madness. kamerbeek 
perceives Heracles’ unclear utterance from the third part of the tragedy (1386–
1388) as a request for Theseus to guard him, as he himself was afraid that he 
would not control his anger at Eurystheus.43 
In the psychoanalytic context, all kamerback’s arguments can be accepted, 
except the last one. Indeed, as I suggested earlier, reversal of the labours-madness 
relation as well as the symbolism of descent to Hades testify to the existence of 
certain “susceptibility to madness” in Heracles. Undoubtedly, a factor triggering 
acute psychosis could have been the sense of being overwhelmed by life’s 
hardships, and his awareness that combating evil in the world had not contributed 
to protecting his own family from it. Also, it seems to be clear that Eurystheus 
does not appear in Heracles’ persecutory delusions by chance. Psychoanalysis 
claims that disorders are always “overdetermined”, that is, they have multiple 
40 This German philologist argued that Heracles represents here a doric ideal of male power 
(βία) that is accompanied by ὕβρις, for which he is punished by the gods. In the last part of the 
tragedy, the character undergoes transformation and becomes passive by abandoning the way of 
violence (wilamowitz, quoted after Chalk 1962, 7 et seq.). 
41 kamerbeek (1966, 10) argues with the unjustified, in his opinion, use by Pohlenz of ancient 
testimonies, e.g. by Aristotle (prob. 30.1), who gives Heracles as an example of a melancholic 
type. 
42 kamerbeek 1966, 12–13. 
43 “[requests of] Theseus’ help in setting the reward for carrying the Cerberus to Eurystheus” 
(kamerbeek 1966, 15–16).
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causes, therefore kamerbeek accurately describes various aspects that could 
have contributed to psychotic decompensation. kamerbeek’s suggestions (those 
mainly concerning external conditions and conscious experiences of the hero) 
can be treated as a complement to the unconscious factors (relations to the 
objects, primitive defences, etc.) analysed here. 
It’s difficult, however, to agree with kamerbeek’s last idea that to some 
extent makes reference to popular psychology (influences of Freudianism are 
visible here, too). what this scholar has in mind here is a mechanism in which 
suppressed or impulsive content bursts into the consciousness as the repression 
breaks down. For this to happen, there must exist a barrier between the ego and 
the id, whose existence was discovered by Freud and other analysts in examining 
neuroses. Nevertheless, the analysis of patient with deep disorders (psychotic 
and borderline) led to a conclusion that separation of psychic structures and 
establishing a repression barrier is a developmental achievement of the oedipal 
period (3–7 years of age) and it does not exist in psychotics or persons with deep 
personality disorders. 
The neurotic is generally in good contact with reality (the depressive position 
worked out – as put by kleinianism), and aggressive and sexual impulses are 
maintained by them outside their consciousness by repression, rationalisation, 
and other mature defence mechanisms. The psychotic, in turn, does not 
apply repression to get rid of aggression, etc. Hence, the primitive defence 
mechanisms discussed here, like splitting aggression from love, evacuating it 
through the projective identification, denial, etc. In the first part of Heracles, 
we do not observe the neurotic attitude towards aggression at all – neither 
Heracles nor other characters (nor the analytic third of the drama) attempt to 
repress aggressive content, rationalise it, or substitute love for it by means of 
reaction formation, which would be a neurotic strategy. Aggression, however, 
is ubiquitous in fantasies and actions, be it Heracles’ sadistic fantasies or his 
murder of Lycus, and is attributed to other persons. what we are dealing with 
here is a breakdown of defences, but not neurotic ones. A kleinist hypothetical 
understanding of the causes of this breakdown will be presented later on.
Studies published in the 1960s and 1970s marked a trend focused on proving 
that Heracles’ madness has neither any relation with his past nor his inner 
psychic life, but is a symptom of irrational interference of the gods. Chalk,44 one 
of the main proponents of this thesis, makes reference both to Euripides’ views 
that he discerns in the tragedy, and the utterances of the characters. According to 
Chalk, Euripides sketches an image of immoral gods, as being virtuous is only 
characteristic of human beings. Apart from presenting the conception of two 
types of virtue in Heracles (“active achievement” and “impotent endurance”45), 
44 Chalk 1962, 15–17. 
45 Chalk 1962, 12. 
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Chalk claims that the tragedy demonstrates that violence (βία) exists both in the 
human and divine world, and is unavoidable. 
A similar view was presented half a century later by karelisa Hartigan, 
and her views appear to be even more poignant and radical. She compares 
Heracles to Oedipus, and puts emphasis on his being totally “innocent”, as if 
willamowitz and other scholars up until Grube had tried to accuse Heracles 
of anything.”46 Hartigan wants to see a good man in the hero crushed by an 
unexplained irrational fate. She fleetingly notices the relation between Heracles’ 
labours (proof of his goodness) and his murder of Eurystheus in madness (a 
sign of his violence and folly) by calling the latter another labour of the hero.47 
At the same time, however, she ignores those relations by concluding that there 
is not any continuity between the “sane” and the “mad” Heracles. In addition, 
she builds her opinion on a strong contrast between his good character and the 
bad gods.48 A similar picture of Heracles can be found in an article published 
one year earlier by Mikalson, who states that Heracles’ piety is extraordinary, 
and that – although in Euripides’ tragedies misfortune usually befalls the main 
character as punishment, in this case it is not so, because Heracles never offends 
the gods in the first part.49 what escapes Mikalson’s attention, however, is that 
both Heracles’ family and the chorus keep speaking about him as better than 
zeus, and Heracles himself does not hesitate to accuse zeus and Hera in the last 
part of the tragedy (1263 et seq., 1303 et seq.).50 
Complementary to such a perception of Heracles, which I’m not afraid to call 
a little idealised, is the way the figures of gods in the tragedy are interpreted by 
scholars. kamerbeek who refrains himself from unilateral view of Heracles, at 
the same time claims that the fundamental thesis of the tragedy is the existence 
of bad, irrational forces in the universe, which are responsible for the main 
hero’s misfortune, although anthropomorphisation of these forces in the tragedy 
is supposedly only a conventional technique of Euripides.51 Also Chalk does 
not hesitate to deem the gods as actually acting, totally bad persons/forces. It’s 
46 k. Hartigan (1987, 127–133) writes as follows: “In an effort to see a continuity in what 
seemed to be a discontinuous play, wilamowitz suggested that a megalomaniac tendency was 
visible in Heracles’ first appearance; his theory influenced earlier scholars but no one more recent 
than Grube (drama, pp. 252–3), finds it true today.” 
47 “His madness is beyond his control, yet it acts through his virtue – his strength – to achieve 
his ruin. Thus, maddened, he takes his bow and sets out on another athlos.” (Hartigan 1987, 128). 
48 “Heracles may have been god-like, but he is not like god: the divinities kill and have no 
concern, but Heracles realizes his act and takes responsibility for it.” (Hartigan 1987, 128).
49 “In all other regards Heracles is exceptional, even exemplary, in his piety” (Mikalson 1986, 96). 
50 Mikalson reaches for philosophical and theological explanations to justify some utterances 
of Heracles, and convinces us that Heracles speaks in them in the name of Euripides himself 
(Mikalson 1986, 89–98). 
51 “what follows implies the repudiation of the very existence of the traditional 
anthropomorphic gods as gods but not of the evil powers responsible for Heracles’ unhappy fate, 
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them who, judging by Chalk’s description, are practically insane and irrational, 
representing something he calls “Cosmic Madness”, and are totally responsible 
for the madness that befalls the main character. On the other hand, Chalk protects 
Heracles from defaming him by willamowitz and his interpretation followers, 
who attempt to ascribe bad intentions to Heracles.52 
Over twenty years later, a similar picture of the gods can be found in a 
short study of Lefkowitz, devoted to the relationship of people to the gods in 
Euripidean tragedies, where she notices that the author many times sketches 
a picture of indifferent gods who do not embrace human moral standards 
(although these gods appear to be perhaps “human” rather than “less than 
human”). In addition, Heracles is considered to be a tragedy in which the gods 
are presented as forces unambiguously and exclusively ominous.53 This matter, 
however, is not unambiguous, as Lesky in the face of difficulties caused by the 
interpretation of the image of the gods in Heracles only states that “the role of 
the gods in Euripides raises many doubts; in Mad Heracles we get lost totally 
in this respect.”54
Accordingly, one group of scholars appears to represent an approach which 
to great extent is consistent with the way things are seen by the characters of 
the tragedy. This type of identification with the characters can be seen in the 
attempts to “save” and “protect” Heracles from the “charges” of willamowitz 
and the like. For instance, according to Chalk, it’s Euripides, as the author, 
who protects Heracles from any justification of political infanticide (which he 
allows Amphitryon twice) to save in this way his goodness from being tainted 
with evil. what’s more, Chalk refers here to Heracles’ personal “impression” of 
goodness.55 
Many other scholars examining this tragedy have gotten a different 
“impression” perceiving in the figure of Heracles both a portent of madness 
and less noble features. Certainly, this is the case with willamowitz and the 
early authors,56 but not only with them. Silk, as opposed to Chalk or Hartigan, 
and such a repudiation may correctly be considered to be the final conclusion to be drawn from the 
presentation of Heracles’ fate in the preceding tragedy.” (kamerbeek 1966, 9). 
52 Chalk 1962, 16–17. He writes: “wilamowitz’ picture of a megalomaniac brutalised by 
bloodshed is a caricature: but though Herakles is noble, bloodshed is brutal, the consequence of 
Cosmic Madness.” 
53 “whatever these or other well-meaning mortals would like them to be, ‚the powers which 
govern the world and man’s destiny are unpredictable, implacable (though we must try to placate 
them), more often hostile than favourable, extremely rough in their justice, and [in the Heracles] 
downright malignant.’” (Lefkowitz quotes Stinton here, p. 82).
54 Lesky 2006, 436. 
55 “with Herakles himself Euripides is careful not to compromise our impression of his 
goodness by saying definitely that he would kill children when sane” (Chalk 1962, 17). 
56 Sheppard considers Heracles’ idealisation unsettling (Sheppard 1916, 76–78), likewise later 
– Parry: “For the chorus elevate their hero to so dangerous a height that his fall becomes almost 
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does not see in Heracles an explicitly good figure, but considers him – which is 
meaningful – to be an ambivalent figure. This author, similar to Barlow, seems to 
be sensitive to symptoms of bizarreness and discrepancy in the entire tragedy, and 
doesn’t attempt to eliminate them like the scholars mentioned above.57 Heracles 
alone is seen by Silk as a figure holding contradictions – (1) unrealistic goodness 
and power coupled with terrifying destructiveness, as well as (1) divine and 
(2) human features. To explain this observation, Silk uses an anthropomorphic 
conception of Mary douglas, which tells about creatures in between different 
worlds, not fully belonging to any of them, and thereby considered as dangerous 
in culture.58 The tragedy itself he describes as Heracles’ passage from divinity 
to humanity.
Other scholars who observe evil in Heracles are: Hamilton, who demonstrates 
convergence of motifs among different images of Heracles in the tragedy,59 and 
– to some extent – willink.60 Much more determined in this respect is Padilla, 
who sees Heracles as a saviour, hiding in himself a power destructive for his 
home. As a character, he oscillates between being god and human, recluse and 
friend, with an undetermined identity.61 Fitzgerald, in turn, in an intriguing way 
stands at the opposite end against Chalk and Hartigan in that he not so much 
sees any discrepancy in Heracles as outright declares that he is a rather negative 
character. while the above mentioned scholars “protect” the main character 
from accusations, Fitzgerald claims that they want to absolve him from his 
sins. According to this scholar, Heracles’ identity is based on his delight taken 
in destroying and killing, in which he resembles Lycus, and his madness is an 
inevitable.” (Parry 1965, 364). Earlier Murray (1946, 106–126) claims that Euripides deliberately 
removes from the figure of Heracles the less noble or simply negative features, thus transforming 
him into a character more adequate for the epoch in which he lives. This is also noted by Silk (1985, 
5), who writes: “The great hero, Heracles καλλίνικος, differs from other heroes – as Geoffrey kirk 
points out – in ‘his brutality, his capacity for dishonesty and his voracious appetites’.” Silk quotes 
here kirk 1970, 177. He also makes reference to a list of Heracles’ negative features in Galinsky 
(1972, 81–100). 
57 “In the H.F. we have, in the first place, the bizarre rhythm of the play.” Silk points out many 
ambiguities in the tragedy, for instance – why Hera sends madness on to Heracles. He also remarks 
that the authors generally avoid speaking of something that seems meaningful to him, i.e. that 
Heracles “is curiously unconvincing as a represented character.” According to him, the scholars 
indicate this problem not through “eager discussions”, but through their “reluctance to raise the 
question at all” (Silk 1985, 2–3).
58 “Heracles lies on the margins between human and divine; he occupies the no-man’s-land that is 
also no-god’s-land; he is a marginal, transitional or, better, interstitial figure.” (Silk 1985, 6). 
59 Hamilton 1985, 22–23. 
60 willink 1988, 88. 
61 “As is often true in his mythical portrayals, the illustrious savior-hero is, at heart, an itinerant 
and a disruptive force to the oikos (cf. his roles in Alcestis and Trachiniae)” and “As such, the 
play leaves Heracles with an oddly ill-defined and unsettled identity, one that oscillates unstably 
between god and mortal, loner and philos.” (Padilla 1992, 12). 
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expression of what is “innate in his self” and a “logic of his own values.” In the 
end he proves to be a coward.62 
Even such a cursory review of interpretations of Heracles and the gods 
testifies to the existence of the processes which I have attempted to demonstrate 
in the tragedy itself. The image of both Heracles and the gods is subject to 
splitting, which means that extremely good or evil features are attributed to them 
with concurrent denial of the other part of the image. divergent reactions of the 
scholars appear to reflect (in their unconscious) the psychotic composition of 
the tragedy, in which splitting, idealisation and denial dominate.63 Thus, there 
are two possibilities – either Heracles is totally good and innocent, and then the 
aggression contained in him is projected onto the gods, who become hostile and 
irrational persecutors, or Heracles is aggressive and mad, and what the gods are 
doing is somehow connected with what he is doing. Looking with detachment on 
this image points precisely to the main subject of Heracles, which is protection 
from psychotic fears through projection of aggression and envy onto external 
objects. when this protection breaks down, evil attack of these objects makes 
the main character go insane.
From the perspective of such a psychoanalytic interpretation, each of the 
extreme and diverse opinions of the scholars contains some part of the truth, 
depending on which aspect a scholar was sensitive to. However, this is not 
a question of a superficial statement “everybody is right”, as with consistent 
application of psychoanalytic methods one has to arrive at certain conclusions 
in the issue of e.g. continuity of the psychotic process, and where to ultimately 
locate the destructive forces present in the tragedy. 
It seems that the key issue is symbolic treatment of the world of the gods 
and the world of people. The world of the gods denotes what’s internal, i.e. the 
sphere of primitive fantasies subject to violence, while the human world denotes 
what’s external and real, i.e. the sphere where omnipotent control of the object is 
impossible.64 Other symbols related to this dichotomy include, on the one hand, 
dream, apparition, hallucination, night, and on the other hand, reality, logic, 
earth illuminated with sun. Silk rightly believes that Heracles lives on the border 
of these two worlds while belonging to neither of them. This means that in the 
first part of the tragedy he is neither fully detached from reality (except for the 
episode of madness), nor fully in contact with reality. Both the forces which 
62 Fitzgerald 1991, 91–95. 
63 Lesky (2006, 437) explains drastic discrepancies in the image of the gods, and the 
incoherence in the form of the tragedy by means of a conception of only two parts of the tragedy, 
but also one of its two concurrent dimensions, where one is a drama about a man who saved his 
family, and then murdered it, and the other – a mythological tragedy about a jealous goddess’s 
hatred. In the entire play, he notices “gaps, tensions and cracks”. 
64 Continual distortions of the gods’ images impede interpretation of their role in the drama 
(see Lesky 2006, 436). 
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attract him towards the world of the gods (in the direction of psychosis), and the 
forces pushing him towards reality (in the direction of sanity, or in other words, 
the depressive position, in klein’s terminology) are present in him. The tragedy 
as a whole, as Silk rightly argues, is a way from divinity to humanity,65 that is – 
one could supplement it – from fantasy to reality, and from psychosis to greater 
sanity.
If we follow this interpretative path, we must also admit that the figures 
of gods symbolise the objects, ergo, the forces residing inside the psyche (of 
Heracles, or rather – the analytic third of the drama), and not outside, in the 
“real world.” Such an understanding of the world of the gods is not alien to the 
tradition of scholarly research in Euripides. Jacqueline de Romilly perceives two 
great topics of Euripidean tragedies: irrational passions consuming the man, and 
the gods’ playthings reigning over human fate.66 In some plays (like Medea), 
the gods are deprived of their influence on human life, while in others the gods 
play with the man as a puppet. what’s striking here is a similarity between these 
two spheres: psychic forces and the world of the gods. Romilly is sceptical about 
the psychoanalytic interpretations of the tragedy,67 so she doesn’t associate them. 
Nevertheless, at the end of discussing Euripides’ output, she states that “the gods 
we see in action, if they are not just symbols of human feelings, reiterate (in 
magnification) human passions.”68 
This view about the conflict between mind and passions has been recently 
referred to by Czerwińska, who points out Euripides’ psychological approach 
in his dramas, particularly the motifs of love and death. In her opinion, the 
conditions of human actions reside in the psyche and experiences, and not in 
any external events, however, she does not make reference to any interpretations 
of divine characters in the tragedies.69 Elsewhere, Czerwińska states that “the 
gods sometimes appear in Euripides as a personification of internalised forces 
of the human soul, which condition the man’s behaviour, thereby influencing the 
man’s fate. Hera, Lyssa and Iris turn out to be personifications of the emotional 
element in the man, which reaches an intensity of madness.70
Even more emphatically in favour of such a symbolic understanding of the 
gods is Ferguson. He is confident that the gods, at least at a certain level of 
meaning, represent internal forces acting in the human psyche, and Euripides’ 
65 Silk 1985, 12. 
66 de Romilly 1994, 116–140. 
67 For two reasons – the first being simply a disbelief in the influence of the unconscious on 
autonomous artistic intentions of the authors, and the other being a conviction about differences 
in the mentality between the people in Antiquity and people nowadays (de Romilly 1994, 146–
151). 
68 de Romilly 1994, 140. 
69 Czerwińska 2005, 783. 
70 Czerwińska 2005, 827. 
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tragedy results from a situation in which these forces are too strong to be 
controlled. In writing about Heracles, Ferguson recognises zeus as the symbol 
of affirmation of life or life-force, and Hera as the negation of life or power of 
death and destruction as opposed to zeus.71 Silk suggests something similar with 
reference to Lyssa, who seems to be, like Iris, an independent goddess, but does 
not appear in the mythology – she personifies madness. The author suggests 
that the audience, bearing in mind the earlier murder of Linos, could assume 
that Lyssa simply means Heracles’ own madness. Silk does not draw any further 
conclusions, although this contradicts his earlier statement: “there has been no 
sign of any insanity in Herakles.”72 winnington-Ingram and knox also believe 
that the gods in Greek poetry symbolise uncontrollable forces of human life.73 
Yoshitake agrees with such a possibility, but only sees in it an evidence of the 
gods’ immorality, and not their potential “intrapsychic” status.74 
Important are also observations of dodds, who generally sympathised with 
using psychoanalytic tools to understand the Ancient culture, and particularly 
his analyses of what he calls “psychic intervention.” In dodds’s approach, the 
gods and divine forces in the archaic culture symbolised (but this is a specific 
symbol) states of altered consciousness and being consumed by passions, 
which, however, did not release people from responsibility. From the kleinian 
perspective, particularly interesting are dodds’s deliberations about well-
know Homeric metaphors of “putting something in the character’s breast” by 
a goddess, or characteristic experiences of character, in which various parts of 
their personalities (of clearly somatic reference) are treated as autonomous to 
some extent. These are nearly typical descriptions of primitive introjection and 
projection, as well as of paranoid-schizoid fragmentation/splitting, which in a 
lesser intensity are visible in Heracles. dodds’s understanding is seemingly well 
suited for applications within the psychoanalytic interpretation of literature, as it 
concurrently admits some “realness” (from the perspective of the presented world) 
of divine forces, and psychological processes underlying such projections.75
Ferguson’s and Silk’s interpretations also harmonise with the psychoanalytic 
interpretation of the text. In the light of the assumptions made here, and the 
analytic conceptions used, the gods constitute internal objects of the space of the 
drama, which are then, through the fundamental projection mechanism, placed 
in the external world, and their images strongly split, idealised and omnipotently 
controlled. In a certain sense, therefore, for Heracles as the main character the 
gods are both real external beings (as kitto writes, they exist “in a dramatic 
71 Ferguson 1969, 113. 
72 Silk 1985, 14, 16. 
73 Compare winnington-Ingram 1960, 169–197; Easterling, knox 1985, 322. 
74 Yoshitake 1994, 142. 
75 See dodds 2001, 11–30. 
130 MATEUSz STRóżYŃSkI
sense” of this word76), and a manifestation of his own psyche. what’s important 
in the approach presented in this article is rather what happens with the images 
of the gods, as they are subject to intriguing operations – just as Heracles’ image 
is – that can be explained using the notions of primitive defence mechanisms. 
None of the scholars explains – at least in a satisfactory and complete way – the 
reasons for these continual changes, and I believe that this can be done using the 
kleinian theory of psychosis. 
5. BREAkdOwN OF dEFENCES ANd dECOMPENSATION
After clarifying the assumptions, let us look at the very moment of appearance 
of the psychotic episode as a result of a breakdown of the mechanisms of the 
paranoid-schizoid position. As early as at the beginning of the fourth epeisodion, 
still before Lyssa appears, the chorus is stricken with a strong fear of something 
undetermined (οἷον φάσμα 817). Growing fear usually causes reaching for 
stronger psychotic mechanisms. From the level of the analytic third of the 
drama, the appearance of Lyssa and Iris can be considered as crystallisation 
of an unclear sense of threat in the form of specific persecutory objects. John 
Steiner writes: “This can be observed in patients of ‘delusional mood’, in whom 
extreme fear is accompanied by depersonalisation and a sense of indescribable 
terror; it seems that what brings them relief is the change of unidentified terror 
into a determined system of delusions. Some patients clearly calm down and 
feel better, when fears and feelings of being persecuted get limited to an area 
determined by a system of delusions controlled by the psychotic structure.”77 
Presence of the persecutory objects (Iris and Lyssa) also intensifies aggression 
of the subject, which manifests itself in Heracles’ aggression. He defends himself 
against the (internal) threat from the objects through a sadistic attack. The tragic 
situation is that in this moment Heracles breaks any contacts with reality by 
attacking his own perception apparatus and his thinking, which is reflected in 
his experience of hallucinations and delusions. In this situation, Heracles’ attack 
only in his fantasies is focused on the bad object (Eurystheus), while in reality 
he actually destroys the good objects.78 The bad objects are violently projected 
onto Heracles’ real loved ones when he turns his back on reality.
76 kitto 1997, 229. 
77 Steiner 2010, 61. 
78 The delight taken by Heracles in destruction and killing as part of his identity is noticed by 
Fitzgerald (1991, 93), completely outside the psychoanalytic context. According to him: “The 
‚madness scene’ expresses what is innate in that former self.” differently, Chalk (1962, 16), who 
states that the common feature of the bad Lycus and the good Heracles is violence only, but that 
this does not matter in view of the fact that their intentions vary totally. Thereby, Chalk omits the 
fact that Heracles feels satisfied with his aggression. 
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This breaking of the contact with reality can only be explained in the 
context of what had happened earlier in the analytic third of the drama, and 
not only in Heracles himself. The main character’s descent to Hades means a 
perilous immersion in the world of fantasies – parallel to this are the chorus 
songs portraying Heracles as a god. The splitting seemingly fulfils its function 
by separating good from evil and defending the psyche from excessive fear. It is 
visible, however, that the omnipotent idealisation of Heracles and combating the 
bad objects is growing as the tragedy unfolds. Heracles appears on the stage and 
omnipotently annihilates (real) Lycus, and with him the entire evil. This attack, 
though, is a defensive reaction to fear of his children’s death. The children 
symbolise here the innocent and vulnerable aspects of the self whose existence 
is endangered. 
The tragedy’s turning point is a moment when the fear of the children’s death 
at the hands of Lycus reaches its climax. Heracles appears on the stage having 
returned from the world of his omnipotent fantasies (the labours and Hades), 
and realises that the defence which idealisation provides to the child’s parts of 
the psyche (symbolised by his children and family) is insufficient against the 
power of evil. This terrifies him (ὦ τλήμων ἐγώ 550).79 He immediately reacts 
to the threat. Heracles states that his heroic deeds are nothing because his real 
duty is to protect his children (574–582). The atmosphere of fear returns at the 
end of the epeisodion (624–636). At first, the threat to his children’s life pushes 
Heracles to act, when he sadistically murders Lycus. 
The breakdown of defences is so put by John Steiner: “An individual can, 
despite everything, endure periods of extreme fear, if they manage to maintain 
normal splitting so that good experiences could survive. If, however, the splitting 
is broken down, the entire personality gets flooded with fear. This may cause 
an unbearable condition of catastrophic consequences. Splitting breakdown is 
particularly dangerous when the envy is intensive, as then destructive attacks can 
be directed to the good object so that the destruction cannot be split entirely.”80
A portent of splitting breakdown can be observed in the chorus song that 
follows the return of Heracles, and which was analysed earlier. The chorus is 
afraid that the clear division between good and evil is disappearing (οὐδεὶς ὅρος 
ἐκ θεῶν/ χρηστοῖς οὐδὲ κακοῖς σαφής, 669–670), one that the chorus previously 
wanted to restore omnipotently by means of the fantasy of the second youth for 
the virtuous. In addition, there is another sign of breakdown, and that is envy. 
Here, envy manifests itself only subtly, because the chorus indirectly accuses 
the gods that they fail to divide good from evil, and keep good for themselves. 
Another symptom of envy is a further part of the song, where the chorus states 
that it will draw a dividing line by itself by virtue of the power of its song, 
79 kitto (1997, 226) emphasises a mood of danger and awe dominant at that moment. 
80 Steiner 2010, 61. 
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without any need of the gods, and finally, it equates Heracles with Apollo, which 
means robbing this god of his power and status.
By this moment the envy is growing, but it is also subject to denial. That’s 
probably the way one should understand the third stasimon, in which the chorus 
suddenly restores the gods’ original status, praises the marital bed that produced 
Heracles (798–804), ensures that it believes in Heracles’ divine origin from 
zeus, and thanks the gods for the fact that they like justice (813–814). Such 
an idealisation which follows directly after devaluation can be considered as 
defence against a growing power of envy (it was Heracles who saved the family, 
the gods did nothing). This defence, however, breaks down under pressure of 
the force of aggression and fear, when Iris and Lyssa appear on the stage. 
In the scene that unfolds now, the envious projective identification is 
visible, too. Iris emphasises the effects of human envy (that of Amphitryon, 
Megara and the chorus) by saying that if Heracles went unpunished, the gods 
would be nothing in relation to the greatness of humans (θεοὶ μὲν οὐδαμοῦ/ 
τὰ θνητὰ δ᾿ ἔσται μεγάλα, 842–843). Iris is also guided by an envy which 
results from human envy. In the projective identification, the envy is placed 
in the object so that the object appears to be jealous of the self’s goodness 
by raising fear of revenge. The gods feel so degraded by the humans that in 
their fantasies they try to take revenge, and take away the appropriated good. 
In the beginning, Lyssa surprisingly identifies herself with Heracles – she 
stresses his merits, the fact that he removed evil from the world and restored 
the gods’ honour by his intention to save it from Hera’s attack.81 However, 
after a while – which seems quite strange, and is not commented on by the 
scholars – she not only admits coldly that she must do what she is told to, but 
also her image of Heracles gets changed dramatically. 
Lyssa’s utterance reveals a sadistic satisfaction with a possibility of destroying 
the good achieved by the main character (861–873). If Lyssa really perceives 
virtue in Heracles, and even is grateful to him in a sense (since mentioning his 
restoring the gods’ honour is another thing), then she should carry out her duty 
at least with a certain degree of reluctance, and not joy. what’s present here is a 
strong parallel to Heracles, who also seems good in the beginning, and then bad, 
but the reader is encouraged to justify his violence with an external compulsion. 
Therefore, the fundamental dynamics consist in that the gods’ aggression towards 
Heracles is closely related to Heracles’ aggression towards Lycus – in a way, it’s 
a response to it.82 
81 According to Lesky (2006, 431): “Euripides couldn’t have demonstrated the meanness of 
this action more effectively than through Lyssa’s opposition.” 
82 This is noticed by Padilla (1992, 5) in a similar use of δίκη in the description of the murder 
of Lycus (740), and the retribution for it by the gods (841–842). “Other verbal parallels reinforce 
this comparison, as does the fact that the two retributive actions are completed in the same location 
(the interior of the domos).” . He demonstrates that the motif of “Gorgon eyes”, which at first was 
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In this scene, Lyssa (object) is filled with envy at Heracles, but defends 
herself from it by admiring him. However, when she obtains “permission from 
above” to destroy the good being subject to envy, her defensive idealisation 
disappears and an underlying satisfaction coming from robbery and destruction 
is revealed. Still, Lyssa is, in a sense, Heracles’ unconscious fantasy, and her 
envy at him is his envy at her. It’s as if split parts of Heracles found themselves 
through projective identification in Lyssa and attacked him reflexively, 
destroying his defensive structure and provoking an attack on dependent parts of 
the self. Lyssa’s admiration corresponds with the omnipotently idealised image 
of Heracles of the first part, her sadistic satisfaction with his sadism, her envy 
with his envy, and even blaming Hera is in common here.
The mechanisms protecting from fear break down, and Heracles becomes 
overtly psychotic. In the Messenger’s description, both hallucination, and 
delusions can be seen – Heracles does not know where he is, he travels, chases 
and kills, he thinks, Eurystheus and his children believing that his own family is 
the internal objects he hates. The attack on Eurystheus is also a defence against 
a destroying attack that Heracles fears, and which is symbolised by the threat to 
his children’s and wife’s lives. 
It’s also worthwhile to note a process of multiplying bad objects. Previously, 
it was only Lycus, and now there are four of them: Hera (who does not appear on 
an attribute of Heracles (in his children), now returns as an attribute of Heracles overwhelmed by 
Lyssa – the projected aggression destroys the self. A similar function performs Heracles’ club, 
which at first is an attribute of his saving labours, and then smashes his son’s head (Padilla 1992, 
7–8 and 12). Similarities are also perceived by Fitzgerald (1991, 93) and willink (1988, 88) writing 
of a double meaning of πόνος. At first, these are omnipotent heroic deeds, and subsequently, 
passive suffering under the impact of the attack of the gods – the relation between the aggression 
of the self and being persecuted is visible here. Hamilton (1985, 22–23) also demonstrates how 
the same expressions appear in Amphitryon’s description of Heracles’ heroism, the description of 
Lyssa, and the Messenger’s account of Heracles’ madness. For instance, the goddesses unite in the 
fight against Heracles (825), just as he had united with them in the fight against the Giants (180). 
Previously, Heracles was lined up with zeus armed with a thunderbolt (177), and now he takes a 
blow worse than a thunderbolt (862). Previously, Heracles celebrated the victory in a comos (180), 
and now Lyssa playing to him on an aulos of fear will force him to a dance of destruction (871). 
Silk (1985, 17) considers the dialogue between the goddesses as “by any standard, extraordinary.” 
He points out to Lyssa’s “identification” with Heracles, when she defends him, and a general 
“intimate relationship” between them. Silk’s psychological intuition does not fail him, when he 
writes that a metaphor of Heracles’ fighting with his own madness is visible here, only that at 
the same time this is a process of intensification of this madness through projection. “He is the 
killer and she is the killer, because she is both independent of him and an aspect of him. The 
staging makes her external; the words tend to suggest her internality” . kamerbeek demonstrates 
Euripides’ use of tragic irony that combines what can be called a psychosomatic condition with 
overtly psychotic condition. For instance, Megara is afraid that her children will be killed by Lycus, 
and in the end they get killed by Heracles, who is a “negative” Lykos. Amphitryon (kamerbeek 
1966, 158–203) defends from Lycus the value of Heracles’ “bow and arrows”, which later on will 
turn out to be an instrument of murder, etc. (kamerbeek 1966, 6). 
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the stage and is only mentioned from time to time), Iris (who wants to enviously 
destroy Heracles), Lyssa (most associated with Heracles’ psyche), and Eurystheus 
(present in the hallucinations, directly responsible for the threat to the lives of 
Heracles’ family). It seems that this configuration resembles an intrapsychic 
“pathological organisation” first described by Rosenfeld, and currently this 
conception has been widely developed and applied by contemporary kleinists, 
such as John Steiner. According to this idea, the psyche contains introjected 
objects which organise into a kind of “gang” or “mafia.” The innocent and 
dependent part of the self is seduced and imprisoned by that gang, and relations 
with it are strengthened by the projective identification, because the bad parts 
of the self are placed in these objects and give them strength, and the dependent 
self is controlled, tortured or killed by such a gang, and concurrently, this 
organisation convinces the self that it is the only entity which can protect it from 
other, external persecutors.83 
In the pathological organisation present in Heracles Hera dominates, who 
only appears in the characters’ utterances, and still, she is Heracles’ main 
opponent. She is a textbook example of inexhaustible, ideal breast at which 
the baby feels pathological envy. with respect to the myth, we can see how 
the divine, abundant breast which Heracles tries to insidiously suck out, not 
only denies him its inexhaustible riches, but begins to actively persecute him in 
retaliation. At its service is Eurystheus, who substitutes for her to persecute him, 
thus endangering the existence of his family, as well as Iris and Lyssa, who rob 
him of everything at the moment of his greatest success. The object convinces 
Heracles, who no longer has contact with reality, that he must kill Eurystheus 
and his children (innocent and dependent self) for his own protection, but as a 
result they provide themselves a cruel entertainment by watching how Heracles, 
convinced that he is defending himself, destroys himself. 
Therefore, what I suggest from this perspective is to recognise the existence 
of psychological continuity within the analytic third of the drama between the 
psychotic processes of the first part and the breakdown described in the second 
part, and I agree with some scholars who emphasise that it is hard (but not 
impossible) to discover this continuity solely in Heracles’ conscious thoughts, 
feelings and behaviour on the stage.84 
83 Steiner 2010, 75–94. 
84 Silk (1985, 17) writes: “There is no psychological continuity between Heracles now and 
before: there is, rather, a metaphysical continuity between Heracles and the divine realm of which 
madness (as Greek ideology tended to affirm) was one part.” This “metaphysical continuity” is 
nothing other than a continuity of unconscious psychic processes, assuming that the gods may 
constitute a symbolic projection of unconscious fantasies. 
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6. ENdING: HERACLES BETwEEN FANTASY ANd REALITY
Most of the previously quoted scholars draw attention to the progressive 
“realism” of the tragedy, particularly to a clear difference between Heracles in 
parts I and II, and Heracles in part III. In the psychoanalytic perspective, the 
issue here is a passage from the paranoid-schizoid position to the depressive 
position, with surprisingly violent decompensation in the centre of this process. 
The tragedy talks about a madness, but also about a road to reality and sanity. 
In this article, I have concentrated on the presence of psychotic phenomena in 
Heracles in order to demonstrate that Heracles’ madness mentioned in the title is 
nothing accidental and unexpected in the course of the plot. However, while by 
that moment the tragedy is a case study of madness, the exodos is a case study of 
struggling for psychic health, working out the depressive position, whose effects 
are surprisingly successful. Overall, Heracles turns out to be less mad then it 
seems during the tragic murder of his loved ones. For a lack of space, however, 
a more sane and less mad aspect of Heracles and the tragedy about him have 
not appeared in this article, although it is present in the last part of the tragedy.85
with the approach applied here, it is sensible to adopt a final division of the 
tragedy not in three parts, but in two parts – the first one (by the end of the fourth 
stasimon), dominated by the paranoid-schizoid position with the decompensation 
episode at the end, and the other one (exodos), dominated by the depressive 
processes which in this presentation have been omitted, but which are worth 
analysing to obtain a more complete picture of this extraordinary tragedy. Let 
me conclude quoting one of the scholars: “The Heracles myth, on the contrary, is 
all contradiction itself, contradiction which the tragedians explore at some cost 
to the tragic norms and to our emotions.”86 
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary sources
Eurypides, Hercules, ed. k.H. Lee, BSB B.G. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft, Leipzig 1988.
Secondary sources
Arrowsmith 1954: Arrowsmith, w. The Conversion of Heracles, diss. Princeton, Princeton). 
Barlow 1982: Barlow, S. A. 1982. “Structure and dramatic Realism in Euripides’ Heracles.” 
Greece & Rome, 2nd series, 29, no. 2:115–125.
Bion 2010: Bion, w.R. 2010. uwaga i interpretacja, translated by d. Golec, warszawa.
Burnett 1971: Burnett, A.P. 1971 . “The Madness of Heracles”, in: Catastrophe survived, 165. Oxford. 
Chalk 1962: Chalk, H.H.O. 1962. “Ἀρετή and Βία in Euripides’ Herakles”, Journal of Hellenic 
studies 82:7–18.
85 The relationship between the first and the second part of Heracles has been the focus of my 
article: Stróżyński 2013, 223–250.
86 Silk 1985, 19. 
136 MATEUSz STRóżYŃSkI
Conacher 1967: Conacher, d. J. 1967. euripidean drama, Toronto and London.
Czerwińska 2005: Czerwińska, J. 2005. “Eurypides i jego twórczość dramatyczna”, In: Literatura 
Grecji starożytnej, vol. I, H. Podbielski, I, H. 2005 (ed.). Lublin.
dodds 2001: dodds, E.R. 2002. Grecy i irracjonalność, translated by J. Partyka, Bydgoszcz.
dybel 2009: dybel, P. 2009. Okruchy psychoanalizy. Teoria Freuda między hermeneutyką i 
poststrukturalizmem, kraków.
Easterling and knox 1985: Easterling, E. and knox, B.M.w. 1985. (ed.), The Cambridge History 
of Classical Literature, Cambridge. 
Ferguson 1969: Ferguson, J. 1969. “Tetralogies, divine Paternity, and the Plays of 414”, 
Transactions and proceedings of the American philological Association 100: 109–117.
Fitzgerald 1991: Fitzgerald, G. J. 1991. “The Euripidean Heracles: An Intellectual and a Coward?”, 
Mnemosyne 4th series 44: 85–95.
Galinsky 1972: Galinsky, G. k. 1972. The Herakles Theme, Oxford.
Hamilton 1985: Hamilton, R. 1985. “Slings and Arrows: The debate with Lycus in the Heracles”, 
Transactions of the American philological Association 115: 19–25.
Harsh 1948: Harsh, P.w. 1948. A Handbook of Classical drama, Stanford.
Hartigan 1987: Hartigan, k. 1987. “Euripdean Madness: Heracles and Orestes”, Greece and Rome 
34: 126–35
Holland 1993: Holland, N.N. 1993. “Psychoanalysis and Literature – Past and Present”, 
Contemporary psychoanalysis 29 (1): 5–21 
Holland 1998: Holland, N.N. 1998 “Reader-Response Criticism”, international Journal of 
psychoanalysis 79: 1203–1211.
kamerbeek 1966: kamerbeek, J.C. 1966. “The Unity and Meaning of Eurypides’ Heracles, 
Mnemosyne 4th series, 19: 1–16;
kirk 1970: kirk, G. S. 1970. Myth: its Meanings and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures, 
Cambridge.
kitto 1997: kitto, H.d.F. 1007. Tragedia grecka. studium literackie, translated by J. Margański, 
Bydgoszcz.
klein 2007a: klein, M. 2007 Miłość, poczucie winy i reparacja. pisma, vol. i, translated by 
A. Czownicka, H. Grzegołowska-klarkowska, Gdańsk.
klein 2007b: klein, M. 2007. Zawiść i wdzięczność. pisma, vol. iii, translated by A. Czownicka, 
H. Grzegołowska-klarkowska, Gdańsk. 
Lesky 2006: Lesky, A. 2006. Tragedia grecka, transl. M.weiner, kraków.
Mikalson 1986: Mikalson, J. d. 1986. “zeus the Father and Heracles the Son in Tragedy”, 
Transactions of the American philological Association 116: 89–98
Murray 1946: Murray, G. 1946. Heracles: Best of Men, [in:] Greek studies, 112. Oxford. 
Norwood, 1964: Norwood, G. 1964. essays on euripidean drama, London–Toronto.
Ogden 1994: Ogden, T. 1994. “The Analytic Third: working with Intersubjective Clinical Facts” 
international Journal of psychoanalysis 75: 3–19.
Ogden 2010: Ogden, T. 2010. ponowne odkrywanie psychoanalizy. Myślenie, śnienie, uczenie się 
i zapominanie, translated by L. kalita, warsaw.
Ogden 2011: Ogden, T. 2011. sztuka psychoanalizy. Śnienie niewyśnionych snów i urwanych 
krzyków, translated by d. Golec and L. kalita, warsaw. 
Padilla 1992: Padilla, M. 1992. “The Gorgonic Archer: danger of Sight in Euripides’ Heracles”, 
Classical World 86: 1–12.
Parry 1965: Parry, H. 1965. “The Second Stasimon of Euripides’ Heracles (637–700)”, American 
Journal of philology 86: 363–364.
de Romilly 1994: de Romilly, J. 1994. Tragedia grecka, translated by I. Sławińska, warszawa.
Segal 2005: Segal, H. 2005 Wprowadzenie do teorii Melanie Klein, translated by Ł. Penderecki, 
Gdańsk.
     PSYCHOTIC PHENOMENA IN EURIPIdES’ HeRACLes  137
Segal 2006 (1957): Segal, H. 2006. “Uwagi o tworzeniu symboli” (1957), in: Teoria Melanie 
Klein w praktyce klinicznej, translated by d. Golec, G. Rutkowska, A. Czownicka, Gdańsk.
Sheppard 1916: Sheppard, J. T. 1916. ‘The Formal Beauty of the “Hercules Furens”’, Classical 
Quarterly 10: 72–79. 
Silk 1985: Silk, M. S. 1985. “Heracles and Greek Tragedy”, Greece & Rome, 2nd series, vol. 32, 
No. 1: 1–22. 
Steiner 2010: Steiner, J. 2010. psychiczny azyl. patologiczna organizacja osobowości u pacjentów 
psychotycznych, nerwicowych i borderline, translated by M. żylicz, L. kalita, M. Lipińska, 
Gdańsk.
Stróżyński 2013: Stróżyński, M. 2013. ‘Love, Aggression, and Mourning in Euripides’ Heracles’, 
eos 100: 223–250.
Verrall 1905: Verrall, A.w. Four plays of eurypides, Cambridge 1905
von wilamowitz-Moellendorf 1895: von wilamowitz-Moellendorf , U. 1895. euripides’ Herakles, 
Berlin. 
willink 1988: willink, C.w. 1988. “Sleep after Labour in Euripides’ Heracles”, Classical 
Quarterly 38: 86–97.
winnington-Ingram 1960: winnington-Ingram, R.P. 1960. “Hippolytus: a study in causation”, in: 
euripide, entretiens sur l’antiquité classique Vi: 169–197.
Yoshitake 1994: Yoshitake, S. 1994. “disgrace, Grief and Other Ills: Herakles’ Rejection of 
Suicide”, The Journal of Hellenic studies 114: 135–153.
PSYCHOTIC PHENOMENA IN EURYPIdES’ HeRACLes
S u m m a r y
Euripides’ Heracles has drawn the attention of numerous scholars since willamowitz’s ex-
cellent commentary on the play. The play has been seen as lacking unity, full of contradictions, 
incoherent, bizarre even. Later critics tried to show structural unity, especially by analysing recur-
rent motifs and ideas. The madness was explained by willamowitz, Verrall, Pohlenz, Grube, and 
others with reference to Heracles’ inner process, of a “megalomaniac” character. Such psychologi-
cal interpretations of madness were widely questioned in the second half of the 20th century, and 
Heracles himself provoked extreme reactions and opinions by scholars. In the article Heracles’ 
madness is considered a central theme of the play, expressed both in the fragmented and split 
structure of it and in the contradictions and bizarre elements within the tragedy. I used Melanie 
klein’s (especially, the concepts of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions as well as of 
primitive defence mechanisms) and her followers’ (especially, Segal’s notes on symbol formation 
and Bion’s theory of psychotic thinking) theory to show the essentially psychotic character of the 
play. The dramatis personae, in their behaviour and words manifest such psychotic mechanisms 
as splitting, denial, idealisation, projective identification, and omnipotent control, as well as primi-
tive envy. The gods can be seen as projections of Heracles and other characters, as well as of the 
common unconscious space of the play (“the analytic third” of the tragedy, to use Thomas Ogden’s 
concept). The climactic Heracles’ madness is understood as a breakdown of psychotic defence 
mechanisms, cause by intense, yet split off, envy and by a powerful threat to dependent parts of 
the self, symbolised in Heracles’ children and wife. The whole tragedy is a way from the world of 
fantasy, gods, underworld towards the more realist world of human beings and their relationships, 
which in kleinianism can be conceptualised as a movement from the paranoid-schizoid position 
to the depressive one. 
